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Abstract Africa’s hitherto negative image is now being rapidly replaced by a new
persona: ‘Africa on the rise’. Developed mainly from Africa’s growth experience,
this re-imaging of Africa has generated considerable interest even among Africanists
concerned that the continent has often been the target of crisis jokes. Even more
notably, the rebranding of Africa has gained traction in corridors of power and
centres of finance. For this latter group, however, the narrative signals more than a
cultural repackaging. It is about confirming that Africa is ripe and ready to host
investment and to open up markets in areas where they did not exist or existed but
were not capitalist in form. Either way, however, the ‘Africa on the rise’ narrative
achieves a major political and economic goal. Neglecting ethical questions about
sustainable jobs, inequality and ecological crisis, while extolling the virtues of
capital accumulation, it extends a particular neoliberal ideology which favours
people with market power, not the majority with precarious positions or their
relationship with nature.
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INTRODUCTION
Once proclaimed ‘hopeless’ by The Economist, Africa is now regarded as a
‘hopeful’ continent, incidentally by the same magazine. But why not? The GDP
figures in Africa are impressive. Between 2002 and 2007, GDP growth in sub-
Saharan Africa doubled to an average of 6.2% (Fosu, 2010). This record towers
above the average European figure of 3%. Libya even grew by more than 100% in
2012 only. Globally, about half of the top 10 fastest growing economies in 2012
q 2014 The Association for Social Economics

































were in Africa (Fioramonti, 2014). This image of a fast-growing Africa has now
been stitched on everything Africa, with the February 2014 edition of Highlife
declaring Lagos as theworld’s fourth largest fashion city. The growthmantra is now
frequently discussed in the international media, such as BBC,1 and by the world
leaders when they mount international platforms. This optimism is not limited to
non-Africans: some African scholars (e.g. Twineyo-Kamugisha, 2012), political
parties, leaders and institutions are similarly jubilant (Obeng-Odoom, 2013).
Now that the interest in growth has heightened and African economies are
regarded as ‘lions on the move’ (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010), it is timely to
consider whether the well-being of Africans have improved with the growth of
their countries’ economies by 1%, 2%, 3% or even 100%. This is a crucially
important issue and hence was the theme to be analysed by the Africans invited to
the Heinrich Bo¨ll Foundation in Berlin, Germany. Berlin was seeking considered
responses to the question: is the rapid and impressive growth in Africa to be
celebrated for its well-being producing features? I reflect on this question and its
ramifications as one of the invitees.
For orthodox economists, the connexion between growth and well-being is
straightforward. In theory, an expanding economy typified by more market-based
production cannot be attended with unemployment. That understanding earned
Gerard Debreu a Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1983, except that when
journalists wanted to ask Professor Debreu questions about real-life conditions
when he was visiting Australia, the great economist declined comment.
Apparently, Debreu’s economics could only be analysed within his rigorous
mathematical models.2
That notable real-world challenge to orthodox economics happened in the
1980s, but continuing research and publications by social economists, including
those in this Forum (Spiegler & Milberg, 2013), demonstrate that the schism
between the world of mainstream economists and the real world remains, arising
not only from methodological deficits, but also from ontological and
epistemological ones. The work of de La Grandville and Solow (2009) is one
example where orthodox economists contend that the economic growth–well-
being nexus is axiomatic. Henning (2013), Jerven (2013) and Kappel (2014) show
that Africa’s growth is unsustainable or that the statistical information is
unreliable.
However, the logic of growth itself has gone unchallenged, except in a few
cases (e.g. Fioramonti, 2013). Other commentaries on the systemic nature of the
1 For example, ‘BBC Africa Debate: Africa Rising – Can The Middle Class Drive Growth?’, BBC. Retrieved March
3, 2014, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2013/26/bbcafricadebate.html
2 This information comes from a discussion with an Australian social economist who was closer to this historic
incident than the present author.

































challenges of the growth mantra have looked outside the African continent,
however. Among them are three classics, namely Baran (1957), Mishan (1967)
and Waring (1988). More recent analyses have appeared in this Forum, notably in
the special issue on the political economy of development (Milonakis, 2012).
While Africa-specific analyses are not captured in these accounts, doing so is
crucially important because of the deployment of the growth measure to tell the
story of Africa. So, in what follows, I examine the connexion between growth and
jobs, distribution and ecology; growth narrative and the urban experience in
Africa; and how else ‘progress’ can be measured—beyond growth.
Jobs, Distribution, Poverty and Ecology
Jobs, distribution, poverty reduction and ecological sustainability, all these are
brought about by economic growth. Mainstream economists contend that all
social problems can be resolved with increasing capital accumulation. With more
growth, the poor will benefit and the jobless will find work, and the world will
become more equal, cities more liveable and the environment more sustainable
(Dollar & Kraay, 2002). This ‘growthmania’, Mishan (1967, p. 3) famously
observed, is ‘like a national flag and a national airline, a national plan for
economic growth is deemed an essential item in the paraphernalia of every new
nation state’. For much mainstream economics work, Africa’s growth record fully
complies with the expectations of economic theory. There are strong connections
and causations between economic growth and the rest: economic growth in Africa
is powering precipitous declines in poverty levels on the continent, closing the
income inequality gap, and will usher Africa into the promised land: achieving the
Millennium Development Goals (Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014). To Young
(2012), households in Africa are better off today because of economic growth.
Increasing economic growth has powered tremendous achievements in education
and quality housing, improved the ownership of assets and enhanced the quality of
health in Africa. Although Africa remains poor, growth has produced a
‘miraculous achievement’ in transforming the continent (p. 732). So, policy-
makers will do well to continue in the path of more growth.
However, upon a closer scrutiny of the data used and the statistical techniques
employed for this view, serious questions begin to emerge. Setting aside the
generalising analyses that gloss over the different and differentiating
characteristics of Africa as a continent, Harttgen, Klasen, and Vollmer (2013)
and Rodrik (2014), among many others (e.g. Devarajan, 2013), have questioned
the ‘growth miracle’ story, pointing to major deficits in the choice of comparable
income data with some taken from national accounts and others compiled from

































international sources, inherent conceptual biases, and the deficiencies in the
econometric models. So, while the work of Young (2012) and Pinkovskiy and
Sala-i-Martin (2014) claim a ‘growth miracle’ and a perfect timing for Africa’s
growth and resulting ramifications, the overall effect of the challenges revealed by
Harttgen et al. (2013) and Rodrik (2014) is that these studies do not provide
accurate context-specific analysis of the African experience and, for Devarajan
(2013), undermine national capacity to collect local and context-specific data.
In fairness to some of these scholars (e.g. Young, 2012, pp. 699–700), however,
they do acknowledge the many limitations in their approach and stress how their
conclusion can be valid mainly on the basis of certain ‘unreal’ assumptions.
In real life, however, the situation is more complex. The relationship between
growing economy and well-being is contingent. If growth is inclusive,
ecologically sustainable and job creating, it offers stronger grounds to be
optimistic. That is evidently what is happening in Mauritius and Botswana, as can
be seen in Table 1. In both countries, growth has come with falling unemployment
and poverty levels and, at least in the case of Mauritius, with declining income
inequality. Decisive social interventions and programmes have been aggressively
pursued in both countries. Like education, the cost of housing is low and the
environment clean. Mark Twain once called Mauritius ‘heaven’. In the last few
years, it has been called ‘paradise’ (Highlife, 2014). The same sanguine picture
cannot be painted of growing African economies such as Nigeria, South Africa
and Zambia, to give only three examples. While these countries have experienced
growth, levels of poverty continue to rise or, in the case of South Africa, remain
nearly the same. Inequality has worsened in all these countries. What is even more
disturbing in the South African case is that inequality is substantially worse than it
was when the country was extricating itself from the shackles of apartheid in 1994.
Table 1: Current trends in Growth, Poverty, Inequality and Unemployment, ca. 2010–2014
Country Growth trend Poverty trend Inequality trend Unemployment trend
Mauritius " # # #
Botswana " # " #
Nigeria " " " "
South Africa " $ " "
Zambia " " " "
Sources: Distilled from Jean-Yves and Verdier-Chouchane (2010), Enweremadu (2013), Kent and
Ikgopoleng (2011) and Chibuye (2014).

































Zambia has increasing levels of poverty, although it is among the fastest growing
countries in Africa. In Nigeria, poverty levels have been rising, reaching some
61% in 2012, and economic growth has counted as neutral or positive the wide and
vast ecological crises brought about by oil extraction. Violence has declined in the
Niger Delta area and Shell Petroleum has ceased operations in Ogoniland, but the
environmental crises have remained and worsened in some cases (Bassey, 2012;
Okechukwu, Ukiwo, & Ibaba, 2012).
The growth-based story of ‘Africa on the rise’ is problematic in spatial
respects too.
Spatial Mismatch
The growth mantra says little or nothing about rural and urban life in Africa,
although given the rate at which urban population is growing we need to
understand the urban, spatial and regional aspects of growth and well-being. In a
recent article on Economist Online published on 2 October 2012, and titled ‘The
urbanisation trap’, The Economist observed that ‘As a general rule, when people
move to work in cities, it is synonymous with economic growth and the more
people do the first, the more countries are offered the second’. Cities in Africa, it
argued, do not live up to this expectation, so the urban population must be very
unproductive or, put crudely, lazy.
This view about cities being production engines and the process of urbanisation
being an effort to crank the engines of cities is faulty on many grounds.
It misunderstands the nature of urbanisation and migration in Africa—a continent
experiencing considerable urban–urban migration, secondary–primate city
migration and even urban–rural migration. There is also region–region
migration, international migration and cyclical migration on the continent.
Much migration is temporary, although there is permanent migration within
Africa too. Each of these dynamics has its peculiarities, although there are
important similarities too, as recently shown by Ozkul and Obeng-Odoom (2013).
Again, the growth mantra overlooks the institutionalisation of capitalist processes
intended to keep certain regions underdeveloped, consigning and compelling
indigenes of these regions to become a backward ‘labour reserve’ as we see in
colonial and dependent urbanisation between Northern and Southern Ghana,
demonstrated in Dickson’s (1968) classic work and in more recent research
(Songsore, 2011). So, to assume that cities arise because of only or mainly
economic factors, one set (poverty and disease) pushing and another set
(economic prosperity) pulling is conceptually problematic. Setting aside the faux
claim about the lack of connexion between urbanisation and urban economic

































growth which exists in much of urban life in Africa (Njoh, 2003; Turok &
McGranahan, 2013)—something the World Bank (2009) has been forced to
accept after much prevarication for ages—it is simplistic to assume that the urban
population in Africa is unproductive.
The UN-HABITAT (2003) offered detailed information about high levels of
productivity, creativity and innovation in various slums in Africa. More recent
studies are consistent and further bring to light the activities of well-organised
labour groups in slums in cities, such as Accra (Farouk & Owusu, 2012) and Dar
es Salaam (Hooper & Ortolano, 2012), and other cities in Namibia (Muller &
Mbanga, 2012). Slums have extreme conditions too, of course, but that is the
point: growth tells us little or nothing about the complexities and varieties of urban
and rural life. In fact, as in these examples, growth emphasis can misinform. As an
aggregate measure, the GDP does not show any spatial differences. While city
authorities in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town compile urban-level GDP
Figures (UN-HABITAT, 2010), growth can only tell us just that: growth.
Questions of complexity, such as informal economies and how they operate, are
overlooked, as the case studies highlighted in this paper illustrate.
There are other urban and regional dynamics that the ‘Africa on the rise’ story
hides. Take the case of Ghana, for example. Obeng-Odoom (2014) shows that with
oil, Ghana was growing around 14% but without oil the country had a growth rate of
about 7% in 2011. So, the economy was doing really well and the economic
managers of the country consistently made this point. However, this story does not
show important ethical problems of widening inequality between the oil city and
other cities in Ghana, inequality between classes within the city, inequality between
in-migrants and natives and inequality between genders—a very important concern
because the current oil-generated jobs are concentrated in male-dominated sectors
of the economy. Yet, by the dominant growth account, Ghana too is rising—
regardless of whether women in its oil city count for little or nothing.
Unfortunately, this growth-based view is what is influencing urban governance
in Africa. In theory, urban governance is a broad-based process, drawing on a
cluster of ideas from decentralisation, entrepreneurialism and democratisation.
That is, governing cities not only by markets and the state but also by other actors
(Obeng-Odoom, 2013). In practice, urban governance in Africa has come to
represent a pro-market state working in cahoots with international real estate
firms, property development consultants and global architectural firms. Together,
these actors create ‘urban fantasies’, whole new cities or satellite cities with
structures and form that mimic the architecture in Dubai and Shanghai. Such
imported plans have little or no local-level input. They tend to supplant the public
mandate of national planning authorities. In Rwanda, Kigali is expected to be
replaced by a new city whose plans were accepted by the Rwandese Parliament in

































2008. Such plans exist in Addis Ababa, Accra and Nairobi. Their urban function is
to inspire business confidence and to ‘decongest’ already crowded cities (Watson,
2013). It is not accurate, however, to regard actually existing urban governance as
completely mutilating of local voices (Bhan, 2014). In urban Ghana, for instance,
city residents have resorted to the use of the media especially phone-in
programmes to hold the state to account (Selormey, 2013). Local and international
civil society organisations such as Ghana Federation of the Urban Poor are
actively involved in grass-roots organisation. Through the collection and
presentation of data on people working in informal economies and settlements,
politicians are beginning to be more careful in ordering evictions (Farouk &
Owusu, 2012). In South Africa, Community Organization Resource Centre in
Cape Town works with the poor and have together developed a programme of
enumeration to deter massive eviction, and it also tries to fight with the poor
through the law courts. In Nigeria, Health of Mother Earth Foundation strongly
criticises poor urban governance processes and outcomes. So, urban governance is
market dominated but this market power is not going unchallenged.
Nevertheless, marketised urban governance has brought about many failings in
urban development.While slumprevalence has declined by some7% inNorthAfrica
and by 5% in sub-Saharan Africa, congestion in cities, increase in income poverty
(UN-HABITAT, 2013) and worsening inequalities (UN-HABITAT, 2010) loom.
Food security is a problem as is food sovereignty. Emissions from private second-
hand cars are increasing as is the numberof car accident-relateddeaths (WorldHealth
Organization, 2013), and urban waste (Selormey, 2013), be it electronic or plastic, is
increasing.
Yet, not all is lost. Cities in Africa can contribute not just to Africa’s
development but also to a just African development. Inclusive and indigenised
forms of planning constitute one way in which this can be done. Cities can unmake
colonial planning policy of separating work from home. Spatial restructuring is
possible and desirable to ensure less travel and less congestion and emission.
Inclusive planning can be done with the media, civil society groups and above all
residents in slums and informal settlements. As Africa now has urban corridors
and city regions such as the Lagos-Ibadan-Accra corridor (UN-HABITAT, 2012),
regionalisation can be more easily pursued to ensure better learning from one
another, better collective strategising and better urban ecological approaches. The
clustering of large sector of people can also make the state show its visible hand
through the creation of urban transportation (Njoh, 2009). Indeed, the hand of the
state can be reoriented to support small-scale urban agriculture, contrary to what is
currently happening in Bameda in Cameroon (Ojong, 2011). There is considerable
evidence that agriculture survives in urban and peri-urban environment and
continues to be done in Africa (Lynch, Maconachie, Binns, Tengbe, & Bangura,

































2012), so there is experience of how this can be done. Moving from ‘here’ to
‘there’ will not happen overnight, but it must eventually do so.
Beyond Growth
As a political-economic concept, ‘beyond growth’ can sound ambiguous, but on
careful examination it is a concrete vision and approach to social and ecological
economic analysis. Generations of social and ecological economists have devoted
much time to its study theoretically and empirically. It is a ‘limit to growth’ thesis
and goes way back to Mishan (1967) and Meadows, Meadows, Randers, &
Bahrens (1972). The Meadows Report strongly advocated stabilisation, even a
reduction of growth, including the highly controversial recommendation of
population control, and the cherished democratic ethos of allowing the nation state
and its peoples to determine for themselves ‘what is produced, how it is produced,
and for whom it is produced’. ‘Beyond Growth’ provides a radical challenge to the
mainstream advocacy of bigger and more integrated markets in the name of
‘globalisation’. One ‘beyond growth’ advocate was Schumacher (1973) who
upheld ‘Budhist living’, that is minimal consumption as an example of a beyond
growth philosophy. Another beyond growth advocate is Daly (1990) whose notion
of ‘steady-state economics’ is now widely used.
Like Schumacher’s ‘Budhist living’, steady-state economics is not an African-
specific argument, but a universal approach. It is based on the view that the
ecosystem within which is the economy has a limit even if the solar system is
regarded as limitless. According to Daly (2007), as the ecosystem cannot grow
beyond its boundaries, it follows that the economic subsystem has constraints too.
Beyond these limits, anymore economic growth is uneconomic in the sense that it
hurts society to grow. While the hierarchies of limits do not work as a brickwall
against which a car will typically crash, but rather like a budget against which one
can borrow but at devastating consequences, the limits to growth are real and dire.
The clash in the current capitalist world, Daly notes, is one between two
impossibilities: one physical (ever-growing economic growth), the other political
(the political challenge to stop economic growth). As the economy is cast within a
finite biosphere and growth everlasting will eventually become ‘uneconomic’, the
current model is likely to lead to clashes between human activities and natural
abilities.
‘Beyond growth’, then, implies reversing the emphasis on growth in economic
policy by destressing accumulation and realising its physical and ecological limits
and Africa can play a part in this process.

































One way to commence this trans-growth and transformative journey is to de-
emphasise GDP stories and emphasise broader measures of well-being such as
happiness. Gross national happiness as a policy priority is widely associated with
Bhutan where since 1972 the economic managers of the country have focused
their efforts at enhancing the happiness of the people of Bhutan—not their
material goals. Even prior to 1972 and dating as far back as 1729, the country had
a legal code obligating the leaders to make Bhutanese happy. Since the
institutionalisation of constitutional monarchy in 2008, it is a constitutional duty
(Article 9) for every leader of Bhutan to expand the frontiers of happiness in the
country. Bhutanese stress spirituality in their conception of happiness, and
humility and service are also emphasised as are sustainability and the concern for
material suffering. These ingredients are systematically collected and analysed by
the Centre for Bhutan Studies. The results of happiness analysis serve as the basis
of policy in that country (Ura, Alkire, Zangmo, & Wangdi, 2012). The Bhutan
experience shows, then, that happiness is not just about emotions: it is much
broader.
Generally, the ideas behind happiness go beyond money to wider
considerations of love, cooperation, sharing quality time with friends and family,
having a can-do attitude, good health, empowering education, spirituality and
harmonious relationship with nature, sometimes to the point of worship. These
can be measured, but not in the way orthodox economists propose to do it which is
reductionist and narrow. For instance, Becker observed that ‘love and other
emotional attachments, such as sexual activity or frequent close contact with a
particular person, can be considered particular nonmarketable household
commodities’ (1974, p. 327). This neoclassical economics view of the family is
in sharp contrast with Keynes’ deep insights on happiness in which he tries to
capture ‘the non-material, the non-optimal, the non(ir)-rational . . . even the
ephemeral and sometimes controversially referring to capitalism as a “spirit”’.
But, it is symptomatic of neoclassical economics approaches to happiness which,
as with other themes in orthodox economics, is narrow, often making little or no
use of historical insights and social economics ideas (Carabelli & Cedrini, 2011,
p. 337). Psychologists and heterodox happiness economists typically use broader
subjective measures such as employing the questions in the Oxford Happiness
Inventory. There have been wide endorsements of the existing methodologies
across different countries in the world and continuing attempts to improve how
this broader measurement can be utilised, and the UN already collects subjective
data on happiness (Argyle & Lu, 1990; Schubert, 2012). In one such survey,
income-poor countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone were rated much higher in
terms of ‘living purposeful lives’ than the UK and the USA, both of which are
income-rich countries.

































Also, Table 2 reveals that the negative experience index (column 4)—the
‘scale indicating the percentage of survey respondents in a Gallup World Poll who
experienced a negative emotion such as physical pain, worry, sadness, stress,
depression and anger the day before the survey’ (UNDP, 2010, p. 224)—
demonstrates there are similar levels of emotional problems among African
people as others in other regions (e.g. the USA and Australia). Furthermore, the
Table 2: The Ranking of a Selected Number of African Countries on Living a Purposeful
Life, 2006–2009
Ranking on the basis
of population living a
purposeful life Country
People who agreed
that they have a
purposeful life (%)
Negative experience
index (0, most negative;
100 least negative)
1 Liberia 100 27
3 Togo 99 21
3 Malawi 99 14
3 Mali 99 13
3 Niger 99 14
3 Namibia 98 16
3 Kenya 98 19
3 Ghana 98 22
3 Cote d’Ivoire 98 16
3 Sierra Leone 98 37
3 Congo 98 23
20 Sudan 97 28
28 Benin 96 24
28 Madagascar 96 19
28 Uganda 96 31




49 USA 94 28
90 Australia 87 22
116 UK 79 24
Source: UNDP (2010, pp. 176–179).

































countries with the smallest share of their populations reporting negative
experience are all African countries, namely Mali (13%), Niger (14%) and
Malawi (14%). While a higher percentage of people in Sierra Leone (37%) and
Uganda (31%) experienced negative experiences, the majority of the population
are not distressed.
The other elements of happiness ‘treated with respect’ and ‘social support
network’ in the UN data-sets, however, do not stand the African countries in good
stead. Indeed, while the top 30 performers on social support are all outside Africa,
the bottom 30 performers are mostly countries in Africa (18 out of 30). The two
countries with the least social support were Togo and Benin where, respectively,
only 28% and 38% of respondents answered ‘yes’ to the question about having
social support. Also, while in all the African countries most people would answer
‘yes’ to being ‘treated with respect’, averagely, there are proportionately more
people in other countries saying so than those in Africa. In turn, while the league
of 30 best performers features only one African country—Niger where 93% of the
population say they are treated with respect—the bottom 30 worst performing
countries include six African countries—Madagascar (77% yes), Rwanda (77%
yes), Tanzania (74% yes), Ethiopia (74% yes), Central African Republic (74%
yes) and Togo (54% yes).
Other data in the UNDP tables on happiness (see UNDP, 2010, pp. 176–179)
show that, while the other elements in the happiness measure are less flattering for
the Africans, they confirm the bigger point: happiness is weakly linked with
material progress. On the ‘treatment with respect’ element, more people (93%) in
Niger say they are treated with respect than several rich countries such as the UK
(90%), Australia (89%) and Japan (60%).
Similar trends—weak links between GDP and happiness—can be found in data
collected by others. One such dataset can be found in the last World Happiness
Report (Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2013). The happiness data
placed sub-Saharan Africa as the least happy region in the world. Also, the bottom
five least happy countries in the world are all in Africa. On the other hand, richer
countries in North America (the USA, Canada) and Australasia (Australia and New
Zealand) rank in the happiest regions category. That said, nowhere in the world, not
even in the richest countries, is the GDP the dominant contributor to happiness and
it is certainly not the sole contributor to levels of happiness—social support,
generosity and freedom to make life choices are also very important, if not more
important. Indeed, if we exclude GDP from the calculations, sub-Saharan African
countries have people showing much greater solidarity, as expressed in having
people to count on, than in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.
Furthermore, sub-Saharan African countries report higher levels of freedom in
making life choices than in theCommonwealth of Independent States and inMiddle

































East and North Africa. Again, people are more generous in sub-Saharan Africa, a
materially poor region, than in Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and
Eastern Europe. Finally, while the richest countries firmly occupy the league table
of happiness, since 2005, there have been major declines in happiness levels,
whereas countries in sub-Saharan Africa are typically becoming happier, and
mostly because of non-income reasons such as freedom to make choices, levels of
trust and solidarity (SustainableDevelopment SolutionsNetwork, 2013, pp. 2–37).
What happens when we factor ecological concerns into happiness indicators?
The last Happy Planet Index Report (New Economics Foundation, 2012) tried to
address this pertinent issue. As with other measures of happiness, the Happy
Planet Index uses well-being and life expectancy data. However, unlike other
indices of happiness, the index uses the ecological footprint of countries too. Well-
being is determined subjectively via interviews and hence it is called experienced
well-being. The interview questions include the famous ‘ladder of life’ question
which invites respondents to use a Likert scale of 0 (least happy life evaluation) to
10 (happiest life evaluation). Life expectancy data are taken from nationally
reported hospital records (reported in the Human Development Reports) but they
are adjusted so that it is the number of happy life years that is taken into account,
while ecological footprint data are mostly gathered from the Global Footprint
Networks. Mathematically, the index is simple to calculate for countries. For any
country, first, determine the product of experienced well-being and life
expectancy and then divide the result by the ecological footprint of that country.
The result of this simple calculation is revealing: Algeria, a poor country in North
Africa, ranks much better (26th) than many notable rich countries such as New
Zealand (28th), the UK (41st) and Australia (76th). The materially rich countries
make a poor showing in the list of 151 countries in which the USA is 105th, worse
than Sudan (101st), Kenya (98th), Ethiopia (94th), Namibia (96th), Tunisia (39th)
and Morocco (42nd). Indeed, even Denmark (110th), widely regarded as
‘progressive’, struggles on this index. To the writers of the report, if the world
were to copy the excessive consumption in the USA in 2008, our world can no
longer contain us: we will need four more planets to sustain us. So, a happy planet
is not one with more accumulation or consumption. Indeed, 90% of the top 40
happiest countries by the HPI index have lower than or at most $15,000 GDP per
capita (New Economics Foundation, 2012).
Happiness research raises concerns exactly for these dramatic differences. One
concern is that unscrupulous policy-makers thinking that their people are already
happy may renege on their duty to provide public services on the pretext that
citizens are already satisfied with their lives. This concern is an abuse of happiness
research because people’s levels of happiness can also be increased. In turn, what
policy-makers should be doing is identifying the sources of happiness, target,

































support and try to enhance them, as they do in Bhutan. A second concern is not as
straightforward. According to White (2013), there are a number of people who are
happy to be sad or, put in other words, do not want to be happy.
What conclusion can be drawn from this important concern? One is to argue
that, for such people at least, happiness cannot be a good measure of well-being.
A second is more orthodox economics related. It is steeped in the ideas of benefit–
cost analysis in which the decision rule is to accept if the benefits exceed the cost.
From this angle, the case of the ‘happy sad’ should be regarded as ‘noise’ in the
data or ignore such people as they are in the minority. Arguably, it is considering
happiness as one (even if the main) of many social and economic indicators only
that is consistent with the critique that growth-based stories of Africa on the rise
are incomplete and misleading.
That critique should be widened to examine the ramifications of the
discourse, not only what it ignores but also what it generates. A discourse that
Africa is rising almost invariably goes with the discourse that Africa is ripe for
investment, which invariably leads to plunder of the common wealth in Africa.
Such ‘investments’ in resources held in common such as water and physical land
have generated massive exploitation and expropriation among agrarian groups in
Africa. Under the caption, ‘large scale investment in land’, the World Bank and
others such as the German Development Bank anoint this approach as the only
way for Africans to prosper. That is, the current land grabs in Africa across the
board—in Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda and
Sudan, to name only seven—and about which much has been written can be
understood in terms of this growth discourse. But, even worse than present
dispossessions are the dire future ramifications and costs. The discourse of
growth externalises environmental costs in the West to Africa and elsewhere in
poorer countries and sends more damaging speculative investment behaviour to
the continent. Previous activities undertaken by Africans mainly for their use and
sentimental value are being swept into the orbit of money and growth. Highlife
magazine had a cover story in its February 2014 issue on Lagos, drawing
attention to how international fashion investors have to flock to the city to see
what money Lagos can offer them. Apparently, Lagos is fourth to New York,
London and Paris, in the commodified fashion world. Written largely to
showcase what is ‘good in Africa’, the effect of such discourse, especially when
it is secularised and monitised, is to extend the reaches of markets to areas where
their influence had been hitherto limited. Seen from this angle, the entire ‘Africa
on the rise’ discourse is not only to showcase Africa as also a ‘good continent’
but also to set it up for further accumulation, exploitation and expropriation. As a
world strategy, it has the tendency to oversimplify life in Africa, to package
Africa and display it as a commodity on the market.


































This article is a modest effort, limited in two important ways. First, it does not
generate new data to enrich the debate. Also, while some issues such as
development and environment, economic growth and distribution of wealth, and
economic polarisation are common in the Global South, the analysis is limited to
Africa, making the scale of the contribution narrow.
Yet, it offers a timely critical perspective on the ‘Africa is on the rise’ discourse
which hidesmore than it reveals in the sense that it is silent on jobs, ethicalmatters of
distribution and ecological problems pervasive on the continent. It says little or
nothing about spatialmatters, provides amisleading framework for the complexities
in the vast informal economies in Africa and opens wide Africa’s doors for external
plunder under the guise of ‘investment’. While a few commentators may wish
simply to tell good stories about Africa to reverse the negative publicity of the
continent, this effort can be and often is compromised. Good storytelling has been
co-opted or conscripted into a narrative about Africa for sale. TheGDP discourse is,
therefore, an effective political tool to excite markets about Africa. It works well in
urban and regional contexts to encourage and stimulate the interest of leadership in
Africa to open up markets, adore market culture and adorn market apparel in the
form of buildings that mark the land and cityscape of market societies.
Wide-ranging social programmes common in Mauritius and Botswana have
much to teach and to offer. Unfortunately, the attention Africa is receiving is not
because of the limited but notable success in combining moderated growth with
redistribution and ecological justice, but only in terms of growth. Here, we see the
selectivity and conceptual preference of a particular mode of thinking over the
rest. Highlighting more damaging discourses which show that Africa currently
receives, but shoving under the carpet the continent’s telling market
contradictions either implicitly or explicitly serves as an important ideological
purpose. So, without de-emphasising growth and re-emphasising broader ideals
and ideas of well-being such as happiness and other socio-economic and
ecological measures, Africa will be pushed into a growth egress and its economies
may be said to be doing really well, but not its peoples, their environment or their
relationship with nature.
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